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Abstract Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? This paper 
attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems influence macroeconomic 
performance. We find that presidential regimes consistently are associated with less favorable 
outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, higher and more volatile inflation and 
greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is sizable. For example, annual 
output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inflation is estimated to be at 
least four percentage points higher under presidential regimes relative to those under 
parliamentary ones. The difference in distributional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 
12% to 24% worse under presidential systems.  
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 1 Introduction  
The proliferation of independent nations following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s 
revitalized the debate on constitutional rules, in particular on the forms of government.1 In his 
seminal paper, Linz (1990) argued that presidential regimes - wherein the president is the chief 
executive officer and is elected by popular vote - are less conducive to stable democracy than 
parliamentary regimes, pointing to the ‘perils of presidentialism’ on two grounds. 2  First, in 
presidential systems both the president and the assembly compete for legitimacy, frequently 
leading to divided government, with serious implications for the stability of democratic systems. 
Second, presidential regimes are associated with significant rigidity owing to both the single person 
nature of the office and the fixed terms associated with it. In contrast, Mainwaring and Shugart 
(1997) assert that presidential regimes also have advantages that may counterbalance some of their 
handicaps. For example, it is argued that presidential systems offer greater choice to the electorate 
who cast votes both for the chief executive and the legislative assembly. In addition, it is suggested 
that a more direct link exists between the choices made at the ballot box and the electoral outcomes 
under presidentialism, in contrast to parliamentary systems in which coalition formation may 
weaken that link, reducing accountability under the latter. Hence, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) 
conclude that presidential regimes perform better where presidents have weaker legislative 
powers and when the political party system is not overly fragmented. 
The work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) (PT, hereafter) on the economic effects of 
constitutions has changed the direction of the debate, initiating a new literature on the implications 
of political institutions for economic outcomes. By exploring both the form of government and 
electoral rules on macroeconomic outcomes, PT uncovered well-defined relationships between 
presidential versus parliamentary regimes and the size and the composition of government 
spending, budget deficits, output per worker and total factor productivity. In particular, they find 
that presidential regimes are associated with smaller governments, lower welfare spending, lower 
productivity and more pronounced electoral cycles. 
                                                                 
1 The origins of the debate on the implications of the form of constitutions date back much earlier. Both Walter Bagehot and 
Woodrow Wilson wrote on the ideal forms of constitutional structure in 1867 and 1885, respectively (see Elgie 2005).  The 
readers of this journal will know that modern constitutional political economy originated in Buchanan and Tyllock (1962). 
2 See Carey (2005) for a comparative analysis of presidential versus parliamentary government. 
 A substantial part of the ensuing research effort aimed toward a re-examination of the impact of 
constitutional rules - regarding both the type of regime (presidential versus parliamentary) and 
electoral systems (majoritarian versus proportional representation) - on the size of government and 
the composition of public spending. For example, Blume et al. (2009) find that having a presidential 
rather than a parliamentary regime has no statistically significant effect on either the size of the 
government, the scale of corruption, output per worker, or total factor productivity.3 In contrast, 
Gregorini and Longoni (2009), by incorporating a large set of political and demographic factors, 
confirm PT’s finding of presidential regimes being associated with smaller governments. Similarly, 
by refining PT’s measurements and methodology, Rockey (2012) re-establishes the negative and 
significant impact of presidential regimes on the size of government. Interestingly, and in line with 
Blume et al. (2009), Rockey (2012) shows that the relationship disappears when the sample is 
extended to contain the new democracies of the 1990s. 
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether certain forms of government are associated with 
better macroeconomic performance, a topic that has received much less attention in the existing 
literature. Even though the size of government, the scale of corruption and the composition of public 
spending (as studied in the existing literature) are important dimensions of policy outcomes, those 
variables would not form the standard set of macroeconomic performance indicators. Two 
exceptions to the above-mentioned studies explore the role of constitutions on economic growth: 
while Gerring et al. (2009) find a negative role of presidentialism on GDP per capita, Knutsen (2009), 
in an extended sample, finds no relationship between the form of government and economic 
growth.4 
In this paper we explore the role of regime type on output and the volatility of output, inflation 
and the volatility of inflation, examining links that largely are unexplored in the existing literature.5 
In addition to those four indicators, we extend our analysis to the link between regime type and 
income inequality. The reasons for including income inequality in our analysis are twofold. First, the 
                                                                 
3 Blume et al. (2009) extend the PT sample by including 31 additional countries that held free elections in the 1990s. 
4 John Carey also related economic outcomes to constitutional regimes, although less formally, in his keynote address to the 
Conference on Coalitional Presidentialism at St Antony’s College, Oxford, on May 2, 2014. In his analysis, Carey inspects a set 
of outcomes such as wealth, economic inequality, poverty mitigation, corruption, the homicide rate, rule of law and 
accountability across presidential versus other regimes. 
5 Indeed, the basis of the loss function widely utilized in the policy games literature is the policymaker’s aversion to high and 
volatile inflation as well as to low and volatile output. See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983), among many others. More 
recently, Woodford (2003) shows that such a framework is a good approximation for policymaking in much richer models 
with microfoundations. 
 level of inequality is an important determinant of political and economic instability with major 
implications for macroeconomic performance, as widely documented (see, for example, Alesina and 
Perotti 1996; Campos and Nugent 2002). Second, a steady rise in income inequality has been 
observed almost universally, reaching record levels at present, which makes it crucial to understand 
its potential sources (OECD 2015).6 
In order to systematically link macroeconomic outcomes to the form of government, we utilize 
an annual dataset for 119 countries over the 1950-2015 period and construct an extensive set of 
performance indicators. We then formally examine the implications of the government system on 
each of those outcomes. Our findings clearly point to compelling advantages of parliamentary 
systems. For example, we find that countries run by presidential regimes consistently exhibit slower 
output growth, higher and more volatile inflation as well as greater income inequality relative to 
those under parliamentary regimes. Importantly, we find that the differences between the outcomes 
under the two systems are sizable: for example, the gap between annual output growth under 
presidential regimes relative to parliamentary ones varies between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points. 
Similarly, in countries run by presidential systems inflation is estimated to be at least four 
percentage points higher than in those under parliamentary regimes. The difference in 
distributional outcomes is even starker; the distribution of income is between 12% and 24% more 
unequal under presidential systems. 
A common concern in analyses of the link between institutional structure - including the form of 
government - and economic outcomes is the potential endogeneity of institutions. For example, it 
may be the case that constitutional forms are determined by economic conditions, such that the 
causal direction of the relationship between the government system and economic outcomes will 
not be straightforward. In light of such widely acknowledged endogeneity concerns, we subject our 
results to a battery of robustness checks as well as a number of remedial actions including 
instrumental variables estimation and the Heckman correction procedure. We show that our main 
findings regarding the role of the form of government on economic performance remain intact in a 
wide range of alternative specifications. 
                                                                 
6 It is now believed widely that the substantial deterioration in income inequality was a key factor in a number of recent 
electoral surprises, including the United Kingdom’s referendum in June 2016 to leave the European Union, the presidential 
elections in the United States in November 2016, as well as the recent parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom in June 
2017 (see, for example, Bell and Machin 2016). 
 What are the policy implications of examining the role of government systems on economic 
performance? Although constitutions remain in place for long periods of time, countries periodically 
consider constitutional amendments, including changes in the system of governance. Indeed, Hayo 
and Voigt (2010) identify 123 changes in the form of government in 169 countries from 1950 to 
2003. Their evidence includes ten post-Soviet Union countries moving from presidential to 
parliamentary systems in the 1990s as well as ten countries in North Africa and Middle East that 
switched their regimes in the opposite direction. More recently, France has made changes to its 
constitution in the direction of a parliamentary system (see, for example, Rogoff 2011). Similarly, 
constitutional reform has been on the agenda in a number of countries in the Middle East since the 
widespread protests, referred to as the Arab Spring, starting in 2011. Also, at present, Turkey is in 
transition from its current parliamentary system into a presidential one, following a referendum in 
April 2017, while widespread protests have arisen in Venezuela and Poland recently over proposed 
constitutional changes. We believe that establishing the link between forms of government and 
economic outcomes serves a significant purpose by providing an important piece of information for 
constitutional framers in countries considering regime changes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, the data and 
descriptive statistics. Our formal empirical results are presented and examined in Section 3, which 
also contains our treatment of potential endogeneity issues, along with some additional robustness 
checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Estimation strategy and data 
2.1 Methodology 
To assess the role of the form of government on macroeconomic performance, we estimate the 
following cross-country panel regressions: 
 Yi,t = α + θPresi,t + γMaji,t + βXi,t + zi,t,, (1) 
where Yi,t represents the dependent variable of interest (levels and volatility of economic growth 
and inflation, as well as income inequality) in country i in period t, Presi,t and Maji,t are measures 
representing the form of government and voting rule, respectively, and Xi,t are a set of control 
 variables, specific to the dependent variable in each case. Although our focus is on the form of 
government, it has been shown that voting rules also matter for economic outcomes; as such, we 
include variables for both types of constitutional rules (see, for example, PT; Blume et al. 2009; 
Rockey 2012). 
We estimate regressions of specification (1) using generalized least squares with random effects 
and time dummies for each period. As a benchmark, we utilize 15-year horizons for each panel (as 
is common in the literature), starting from 1965, thus providing three (unbalanced) panels for each 
country in the regression.7 For each regression, three specifications are estimated incorporating 
three alternative sets of control variables in Xi,t: first, a regression with no control variables; second, 
a specification with a limited number of control variables and, third, one with an extended set of 
regressors. As collinearity exists between the form of government and other independent variables 
entered into the regressions, this sequential process will aid further understanding of the results. 
2.2 Data and constitutional variables 
We use data from a variety of empirical sources as discussed in Appendix A, which provides a full 
description of all variables; where available, all data are collected over the 1950-2015 period. We 
utilize two data sources for our measures of the form of government, each employing subtly 
different definitions. The first is from Bormann and Golder (2013) (BG, hereafter), who define 
presidential systems as those wherein the head of state cannot be removed by the elected assembly, 
as proposed by Cheibub et al. (2010). In addition, a country wherein a popularly elected president 
can be removed by the assembly is classified as operating in a ‘semi-presidential’ regime. All other 
regimes are parliamentary. PT follow a similar methodology, classifying a parliamentary 
government as one that can be subject to a confidence vote; correspondingly, a system for which a 
confidence vote is lacking is defined as a presidential government.8 Table 1 illustrates the countries 
categorized into each form of government by the two data sources; as is observed from the table, 
the only differences between the two sources are with respect to the ‘semi-presidential’ 
classification and the data coverage. The underlying classification of regimes into presidential, semi-
                                                                 
7 Starting the time horizons in 1965 maximizes the number of observations with 15-year panels. Sensitivity to that starting 
date is examined. 
8 PT discuss two dimensions across which they see presidential systems being defined: that of the confidence vote and that 
of the separation of powers between the president and the legislature. 
 presidential and parliamentary regimes also is presented geographically in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix. 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the full sample means for each of the five dependent variables in our analysis, 
under presidential and parliamentary systems, based on both the BG and PT classifications. As can 
be seen, in a great majority of the cases average macroeconomic outcomes are more favorable under 
parliamentary regimes relative to those under presidential ones, and the differences between the 
two systems frequently are statistically significant. Using the lower end of our estimates, on average, 
parliamentary countries grow 0.7 percentage points per annum faster than the presidential ones; 
have 4.6 percentage points lower inflation; have smaller variations in inflation; and have less income 
inequality.9 As is also clear from Table 2, the disparities in macroeconomic outcomes are larger and 
more statistically significant when using the PT definition of forms of government; those differences 
stem from PT’s smaller sample and are not explained by differences in country classifications 
between the two presidential variables. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Figure 1 presents histograms for our five performance indicators under both parliamentary and 
presidential regimes. It is observed that for every macroeconomic outcome, with the exception of 
growth volatility, the better performance of parliamentary regimes relative to presidential ones is 
consistent throughout the sample and is not driven by outliers. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 2 presents scatter plots for countries along the metrics for which the differences reported 
in Table 2 are statistically significant. In each plot, a point represents a country and solid lines 
illustrate the median value for each of the macroeconomic outcomes. In the left-hand panel of Figure 
                                                                 
9 To remove the impact of inflation outliers, we use the method applied in Cukierman et al. (1992), wherein the GDP deflator, 
π, is transformed using π/(1 + π). 
 2 the top-left quadrant represents those countries of above-average economic growth and below-
average income inequality. In this good-outcomes quadrant, 91% of countries are parliamentary, 
representing half of all parliamentary countries. In the bottom-right quadrant, representing worse 
than average outcomes for economic growth and inequality, 61% are presidential countries, 
representing half of all presidential countries. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Similar results are found in the right-hand panel wherein the best outcomes are those found in 
the bottom-left quadrant, namely, below-average levels and volatilities of inflation. In that quadrant 
80% are parliamentary countries (nearly half of all parliamentary countries), whereas in the 
opposing top-right quadrant 48% of observations are from presidential countries (representing 
63% of all presidential countries). 
3 Forms of government and macroeconomic outcomes 
In this section, we present and discuss the effects of the government systems on five separate 
outcome measures, as set out above. They are each taken in turn and are based on empirical results 
from estimating specification (1). 
3.1 Endogeneity concerns 
An important issue in identifying the effects of constitutional rules on macroeconomic outcomes is 
related to the potential endogeneity of political institutions. The concern is that economic conditions 
could influence the choice of constitutional forms and, thus, the causal direction of outcomes is not 
straightforward. Such endogeneity issues arise from two main sources: first, the limited in-country 
variation between forms of government means that statistical inference is based on cross-country 
analysis; second, any decision on the form of government is unlikely to be truly exogenous to the 
political and economic climate of the country.10 Applying ordinary least squares estimation relies on 
conditional independence, that is, the selection of the form of government is assumed to be random 
                                                                 
10 On the other hand, evidence on the insignificant influences of economic variables on the form of government comes from 
Hayo and Voigt (2010), who present a comprehensive analysis of the sources of constitutional changes. They find that 
changes in the form of government - in either direction - are influenced by political factors, such as the characteristics of the 
political system, political leaders and political conflict, but not economic and sociodemographic factors. 
 after controlling for all other variables (X in (1)). Following PT, we take two remedial actions: 
instrumental variables estimation and the Heckman correction procedure. 
3.1.1 Instrumental variables 
The most widely used strategy in the face of potential endogeneity concerns is instrumental 
variables. In that approach, the bias caused by the selection of the form of government in a given 
country being non-random is first estimated prior to estimating the size of the coefficient θ in (1). 
We follow PT in selecting our set of instruments: variables indicating the time when a country’s 
current constitutional form was adopted (using dummy variables for periods before 1920, between 
1921 and 1950, between 1951 and 1980, and beyond 1981); the age of democracy within a given 
country (measured as the length of time in which the Polity database score of a country 
consecutively has been positive); language variables representing Western influences in the 
country; and the country’s latitude.11 Furthermore, similar to PT and Rockey (2012) we apply the 
same instruments for the Heckman correction procedure, explained below. 
Acemoglu (2005) argues that the chosen variables make for weak instruments, as the 
constitutional timing variables have limited statistical significance and the main determinants are 
the Hall and Jones (1999) variables of language and latitude, variables that Acemoglu (2005) argues 
are not convincing instruments for constitutional features. Rockey (2012) refines the constitutional 
timing variables to gain more explanatory power for the form of government in two ways: one set 
of variables are for when a country genuinely holds a democratic election within a given 
constitutional framework (and not just when the constitution becomes law), and a second set of 
dummy variables indicating when a country’s constitution is promulgated. Rockey (2012) 
demonstrates that those factors provide better instruments for the form of government. 
Our approach is to consider three separate sets of instruments, using the constitutional timing 
dummies as in PT, as well as the two sets of timing dummies from Rockey (2012); all sets of 
instruments also include the age of democracy, language variables and the country’s latitude. Table 
3 reports results from first-stage estimates using those three sets of instruments. All have significant 
explanatory power, with first stage F-tests in excess of 30, and even when only the constitutional 
variables are considered, values of over ten typically are present. 
                                                                 
11 A full list and definitions of the variables in our analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
 [Insert Table 3] 
Our strategy throughout the paper is to present results from a panel regression applying 
generalized least squares and, subsequently, similar estimates from applying both instrumental 
variables and the Heckman correction procedure. For the latter two, our benchmark instruments 
will be the constitutional timing variables from PT, as they provide the most consistent 
performances from the first-stage regressions for both institutional timing and Hall and Jones’s 
(1999) variables. Our models are estimated on all sets of instruments to ensure that the results are 
robust. 
3.1.2 Heckman correction estimation 
 Another strategy in testing for possible endogenous relationships in the causal direction, as is also 
utilized by PT, is the Heckman correction procedure. With that method, a potential selection bias in 
the observations that are utilized in the regression analysis is controlled for by adjusting estimates 
for a possible correlation between the random elements in macroeconomic outcomes and the 
selection of constitutional provisions. In the first stage of a Heckman correction, a probit regression 
is estimated on constitutional selection. Similar to PT, we enter dummy variables for the date on 
which the country’s constitution was established, the age of democracy, ‘cultural influences’ on the 
population (the proportion of people who speak English or another European language), and the 
country’s latitude. 
3.2 Economic growth and volatility 
Table 4 presents panel regression results estimating the impact of the form of government on rates 
of annual GDP growth, utilizing generalized least squares with random effects. We incorporate 
standard control variables in line with Barro (2007). For each regression specification, three 
separate measures are entered to represent the form of government: a tripartite variable set equal 
to 0.5 for countries classified in BG as semi-presidential, 1 if presidential, and 0 if parliamentary; a 
second specification using the ‘semi-presidential’ and ‘presidential’ classifications from BG as 
dummy variables; and a similar specification using the data from PT, as discussed in Section 2.2. 
The relevant control variables comprise InitialGDP, which represents the natural logarithm of a 
country’s GDP per capita; Education, measured by the log of the average number of years of  the 
population’s educational attainment; Fertility and LifeExp, measured by the log of the number of 
 births per woman and life expectancy measured at birth, respectively; GovtSize, defined as the ratio 
of total government spending to GDP; and ExRateVol, measured as the standard deviation of the 
nominal exchange rate between the domestic currency and the US dollar. The first four of those 
variables are measured at the start of the panel period, whereas the final two are taken as averages 
over the full sample. Table 4 presents estimation results from three sets of empirical specifications: 
one with no control variables; one for a benchmark specification wherein the control variables are 
composed of InitialGDP and Education; and an extended set incorporating all further control 
variables. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The estimation results in Table 4 point to a clear association between constitutional rules and 
economic growth: the average growth rate of GDP is slower under presidential regimes by between 
0.6 and 1.2 percentage points (consistent with the results from Table 2 and the top left-hand panel 
in Figure 1); the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in the six specifications with no and 
less than a full set of control variables, and at 5% when additional controls are entered. Note that at 
low levels of initial income, Table 4 suggests that presidential countries will grow faster, consistent 
with the convergence hypothesis; that is, lower (initial) GDP per capita is associated with faster 
growth rates such that poorer countries catch up with richer ones. Indeed, if estimations are 
performed on regressions similar to those in Table 4 without controlling for initial GDP, statistically 
insignificant coefficients are attached to the form of government variable in columns (7) to (9).12 
Presidential regimes are associated with lower levels of education, life expectancy, trade openness 
and higher fertility rates (with statistically significant correlation coefficients), all of which are also 
associated with slower economic growth. Collinearity explains why the estimated coefficients 
attached to the form of government variable become smaller in Table 4 in specifications (7) to (9) 
than in specifications (3) to (6), along with why statistical significance declines. The results from 
                                                                 
12 More generally, suppose that a dependent variable (Yt) is a function of two independent variables (X1,t and X2,t) such that 
Yt = α + β1X1,t + β2X2,t + εt is estimated; and X2,t also is a function of X1,t such that X2,t = λ+γX1,t+et. Substituting the second 
specification into the first one yields Yt = [α + β2λ]+X1,t [β1 + β2γ]+ [β2X2,tet + εt]. It therefore follows that the impact of X1,t on Yt 
is both direct (estimated through β1) and indirect (through the effect X1,t has on X2,t). If Y is economic growth, X1 our measure 
of the form of government and X2 (initial GDP), where β1 < 0, β2 < 0 and γ < 0, then the total estimated impact of presidential 
regimes on economic growth is smaller than the direct effect. 
 Table 4 support the convergence hypothesis: conditional on the level of initial GDP per capita: 
countries with presidential regimes grow slower than those with parliamentary ones.13 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 presents results from estimating the effect of the form of government on economic 
growth using instrumental variables and Heckman correction techniques, as discussed in Section 
3.1. For all nine specifications, the sizes of the estimated coefficients of interest increase for both the 
instrumental variable and Heckman correction techniques. Furthermore, the coefficients are 
estimated more precisely and are statistically significant. Presidential regimes exhibit slower 
economic growth, all else equal. 
We repeat the same exercise to examine the impact of regime type on growth volatility, defined 
as standard deviations in the rates of annual output growth. The control variables entered into this 
specification are the same as those above, with additional variables measuring democracy (Polity) 
taken from the Polity IV database, and the volatility of trade openness (OpenVol). As can be seen 
from Table 6, no statistically significant association between regime type and the volatility of 
economic growth emerges in our regressions; these results reconcile with those from Table 2. The 
same holds true for the electoral system, except in two specifications, wherein majoritarian electoral 
regimes are estimated to result in less output volatility. When performing comparable analysis as in 
Table 6 using instrumental variables and the Heckman correction, similar results prevail: a 
statistically insignificant relationship between the form of government and output growth volatility 
is estimated (not reported). 
[Insert Table 6] 
3.3 Inflation and its volatility 
We now turn to the potential influence of the form of government on inflation performance (its rate 
and volatility). We estimate the specification in (1) wherein the dependent variable is the mean of 
the transformed GDP deflator. The GDP deflator, π, obtained from the World Bank, is transformed 
                                                                 
13 Similarly, PT find that presidential regimes have smaller governments. If regressions are estimated dropping GovtSize, we 
find quantitatively similar results. 
 using π/(1+π) to remove the impact of high inflation outliers (as identified in Cukierman et al. 
1992): entering the raw inflation figures would weight unduly a few outliers of very high inflation 
rates. In line with the existing empirical work on inflation, the specifications share common control 
variables InitialGDP, Openness and ExRateVol. In addition to those controls, we enter a measure first 
proposed and developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) of central bank independence (CBI), for which 
more independence is anticipated to lead to more favorable inflation outcomes. That variable is 
reserved for the extended regression specification owing to data availability. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Consistent with our earlier results, presidential regimes are associated with inferior outcomes: 
countries governed by presidential systems experience inflation rates that are on average more than 
four percentage points higher than for those governed by parliamentary regimes.14 That effect is 
consistent across all specifications and is larger when the measure of central bank independence is 
entered. The significances of the coefficients attached to the form of government variable are 
weakened by the electoral rule, the latter being found to be more consistently and strongly 
statistically significant. Countries with majoritarian electoral rules are estimated to achieve lower 
inflation rates, by between six and nine percentage points, than those with proportional 
representation. The weakening of the form-of-government results originates in considerable 
collinearity: parliamentary countries are more likely than presidential ones to adopt majoritarian 
voting systems. Similarly, as discussed in Section 3.2, presidential regimes and initial GDP are 
correlated negatively. Estimating the specifications by dropping InitialGDP leads to larger and more 
statistically significant detrimental effects of presidential regimes. 
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 presents results when instrumental variables and Heckman correction estimation 
techniques are applied. Similar to the results in Table 5, the point estimates with respect to the 
instrumental variable method increase; the coefficients are estimated with more precision and more 
statistical significance.15 The results from the Heckman correction procedure are in line with those 
                                                                 
14 Note that in order to convert point estimates for the marginal impact of the form of government (x say) on the transformed 
variable for inflation, where y = π/(1 + π), one must use the chain rule to get ∂π/∂x = ∂π/∂y × ∂y/∂x = β/(1 − y)2, where β is 
the coefficient from the regression and where the mean of y (i.e., 0.0924) is applied. 
15 Note that some of the increases in the sizes of these coefficients is explained by the smaller sample size owing to the 
availability of observations on the instruments (sample sizes are on average 24% smaller in Table 8 than in Table 7). When 
 from generalized least squares, although they are again estimated with more precision. In general, 
the results from Table 8 are consistent with (if not stronger than) those from Table 7. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Table 9 performs the same exercise for inflation volatility. Parallel to the findings above, inflation 
is more volatile under both presidential regimes and proportional electoral systems; however, 
whereas the results for the voting rule remain significant, those for the form of government are less 
consistently significant. This result, again, arises from the presence of collinearity between the form 
of government and the voting rule: when the regression is run without the latter, the former is 
statistically significant to at least 5% in all specifications. That is, the constitutional framework of a 
country and the volatility of inflation are correlated, and the voting rule explains inflation volatility 
better than the form of governance.16 
[Insert Table 10] 
Table 10 presents corresponding results using instrumental variables and Heckman correction 
estimation. Similar to above, point estimates are larger using those techniques, and are estimated 
with more precision, statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in all but two of the 
specifications. In sum, the evidence suggests that countries with presidential regimes have higher 
inflation rates and more volatility in those rates. 
3.4 Income inequality 
We next turn to the relationship between the form of government and income inequality, a topic of 
considerable contemporary concern. Income inequality is shown to be an important factor 
underlying both economic and political instability, with clear implications for overall 
macroeconomic performance (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996, among others). When 
combined with steadily rising income inequality almost everywhere over the past three decades 
and its record levels at present (see, for example, OECD 2015), we argue that it is important to 
                                                                 
specifications using generalized least squares are run on this smaller sample, point estimates increase on average by 14%; 
that is less than the increase in the instrumental variables approach, but accounts for some of the difference. 
16 Similarly, dropping InitialGDP from the specifications in Table 9 also returns larger point estimates for the effect of 
presidential regimes on the variability of inflation, all statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or higher. 
 understand whether the form of government plays any role in distributive outcomes. To the best of 
our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine that relationship formally.17 
[Insert Table 11] 
The estimation results in Table 11 point to a clear link between the form of government and 
income inequality: presidential regimes are associated with Gini coefficients between 12% and 24% 
larger than those of parliamentary regimes. These results reconcile with those from Table 2 and 
Figure 1. Similar to findings reported above, dropping variables measuring initial GDP, the size of 
government, or both, provide results quantitatively similar to those in Table 11. Finally, Table 12 
presents similar results from applying instrumental variables and Heckman correction procedures. 
When those techniques are adopted, point estimates for the coefficients of interest increase in 
magnitude and are estimated with more precision. 
[Insert Table 12] 
Overall, our results in this section establish that macroeconomic outcomes in parliamentary 
regimes are superior to those under presidential systems. We find that growth is faster, that 
inflation is slower and less volatile, and income is distributed more equally in parliamentary 
systems. 
3.5 Sensitivity 
We test the robustness of our results by entering a number of different explanatory variables in the 
specifications reported above. Both the level of democracy (Polity) and the stock of democratic 
experience (the number of consecutive years the country has been judged to be democratic, 
DemAge) are included in one of our robustness checks. In another, the continental indicator 
variables of PT are entered into the specifications to test for the role of geography; as Figure A1 
demonstrates, presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and Africa. A variable 
measuring the proportion of the population that practices a protestant religion also was tested, 
following the existing studies of religiosity and macroeconomic performance (see, for example, 
                                                                 
17 Shugart (1999) is the only other study of which we know that links regime type to income inequality, albeit informally. By 
listing the sample countries according to their income inequalities, Shugart (1999) points to a strong tendency for incomes 
to be distributed more unequally under presidential regimes. Gregorini and Longoni (2009) look at the role of income 
inequality in the relationship between electoral rules and public consumption spending, finding that income inequality raises 
such spending in countries with proportional electoral systems, but has no effect in nations with majoritarian electoral rules. 
Gregorini and Longoni do not consider the potential implications of the form of government on income inequality. 
 Becker and Woessmann 2009). In all cases, entering those variables into our previous specifications 
had limited effect on the quantitative estimates and statistical significances of the link between the 
form of government and macroeconomic outcomes. Estimates from these specifications can be 
found in the supplementary material.  
We also re-estimated the instrumental variable and the Heckman correction procedures using 
the constitutional timing variables from Rockey (2012) (see Section 3.1 for a discussion of those 
variables) instead of those applied in PT. The re-estimations returned results similar to those 
presented above for both the instrumental variable and Heckman techniques. The instrumental 
variable specifications also were re-estimated with generalized methods of moments, which again 
yielded results similar to those above, with the same conclusions reached. See the supplementary 
materials for those results.  
4 Conclusions 
This paper examines the link between the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and 
macroeconomic performance using data from a large number of countries over the 1950-2015 
period. Our set of measures include output growth and its volatility, inflation and its volatility, as 
well as income inequality. We find clear differences in outcomes under the two regimes studied. 
More specifically, we find that presidential regimes consistently are associated with inferior 
macroeconomic outcomes. Output growth is estimated to be between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points 
lower, inflation is at least four percentage points higher and income is 12% to 24% more unequal 
under presidential systems than under parliamentary regimes. 
Why do presidential regimes produce worse economic outcomes than parliamentary systems? 
To answer this question, it is crucial to understand the wider institutional context in which the two 
systems operate. It has long been recognized that institutions, whether political, legal or economic, 
play a key role on economic outcomes through aggregating conflicting interests into public policy 
and imposing constraints on economic behaviour. One can therefore envisage that constitutional 
rules shape economic outcomes through their role on the form of institutions and, in turn, through 
the influence of institutions on economic policy and hence economic performance. We believe that 
a systematic analysis of institutions across the two forms of government should form a key part of 
the attempt in answering this question and hence is an important task for future research. 
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 A Appendix 
[Insert Table A1] 
[Insert Figure A1] 
 
B Supplementary materials: sensitivity results 
B.1 The role of democracy 
We test the robustness of our results to including both the level of democracy (Polity) and the stock 
of democratic experience (DemAge). Estimates for the variables of interest are presented in panel A 
of Table A3, which reports results using the eighth specification in Tables 4-11. The two indicators 
of democracy themselves are estimated to have significant impacts on the volatility of GDP growth 
as well as on inflation and its volatility, with more democratic and older democracies predicted to 
influence those outcomes favorably. Despite this, as can be seen from Table A3, entering those 
variables has very little effect on the quantitative estimates and statistical significances of the link 
between the form of government and macroeconomic outcomes (a conclusion that also holds across 
different specifications, not just the eight from Tables 4-11; those results are not reported). 
[Insert Table A2] 
B.2 The role of geography 
As demonstrated in Figure A1, presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and 
Africa. In order to test the robustness of results to geographical location, we apply PT’s grouping 
and enter dummy variables for countries belonging to the OECD, along with regional indicators for 
nations in Latin and South America, Africa, and Southern and East Asian countries (leaving a 
benchmark group containing non-OECD European countries and those from the Middle East). In 
panel B of Table A3 we present results using the eight specifications in Tables 4-11, now including 
these regional dummy variables. 
 Given the presence of collinearity between the regional dummy variables and the type of 
government, the statistical significance of our empirical results weaken. Lesser statistical 
significance is most noteworthy for the relationship between presidential regimes and economic 
growth: coefficient estimates change from being statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 4) to 
being insignificant, although the partial correlation remains negative. In all other cases, however, 
statistically significant results reported in earlier analyses are maintained and, hence, are robust to 
including regional dummy variables (that conclusion again holds in unreported estimates across 
different specifications, not just the eight one from Tables 4-11). 
B.3 The role of Protestantism 
We test the robustness of our results further by including the proportion of the population that 
practices a protestant religion, following the existing studies of religiosity and macroeconomic 
performance (see, for example, Becker and Woessmann 2009). The protestant population 
percentage is itself statistically significant and enters with a negative sign in regressions for which 
either inflation volatility or income inequality is the dependent variable. The impact of the form of 
government again remains unchanged (panel C in Table A3). 
 
B.4 Further sensitivity checks 
We also re-estimated the instrumental variable and Heckman correction procedures using the 
constitutional timing variables from Rockey (2012) (see Section 3.1 for a discussion of those 
variables) instead of those applied in PT (2003). These provide similar results to those presented 
above for both instrumental variable and Heckman techniques. We further perform the 
instrumental variable estimations using generalized methods of moments, which again provides 
similar results to those above, with the same conclusions reached (panel D in Table A3). 
We have also explored the sensitivity of our findings to using panels still over fifteen years but 
starting in 1960 (as opposed to 1965 above), leading to quantitatively similar results for all 
dependent variables in the analysis. Point estimates can be larger, especially for growth and growth 
volatility coefficients; however, the fewer observations also leads to slightly weaker levels of 
 significance.18 The results from above are also not sensitive to ten-year panels starting in 1960, with 
similar results obtained from these time periods. 
  
                                                                 
18 Paradoxically, the number of observations in the regressions decreases starting the time horizon earlier in 1960 (by 
approximately 15%) as some countries do not have data starting this early, but do have data starting from a little later 
(1965). Starting the time horizon when we do in the regression results allows for the largest sample of 15-year time periods 
in our specifications. 
  
Table 1 Countries and forms of government classification 
BG 
 PT  
Presidential Parliamentary Not included 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Philippines, Paraguay, El Salvador, 
Switzerland, Uganda, Uruguay, 
United States of America, 
Venezuela 
 Benin, Burundi, Republic of 
Congo, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Liberia, Maldives, Micronesia, 
Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Sierra 
Leone, Suriname 
 
Sri Lanka   Austria, Bulgaria, Comoros, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Senegal, Slovak Republic, 
Taiwan, Ukraine 
Armenia, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Croatia, 
Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Macedonia, Mali, 
Mongolia, Mauritania, Niger, 
Serbia, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Timor-
Leste 
 
   Australia, Belgium, The 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, 
Barbados, Canada, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 
United Kingdom 
Andorra, Albania, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bhutan, 
Czechoslovakia, Dominica, 
Grenada, Kiribati, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Lao PDR, Lebanon, St. 
Lucia, Liechtenstein, Marshall 
Islands, Moldova, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Sudan, Solomon 
Islands, San Marino, Somalia, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
 
The Gambia, Belarus, Namibia, 
Russia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Botswana, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Africa 
 
Classifications of countries by form of government between the two data sets. 
 
 
  
  
Table 2 Presidential and parliamentary regimes: descriptive statistics 
 BG PT 
 Pres Parl Diff Pres Parl Diff 
Annual GDP growth 1.680 2.342 0.662** 1.782 2.527 0.745*** 
 (1.131) (1.437) (0.012) (1.182) (1.284) (0.009) 
 33 56  32 51  
Growth volatility 4.523 4.359 -0.164 3.973 3.668 -0.305 
 (2.764) (2.351) (0.773) (1.465) (1.451) (0.358) 
 33 56  32 51  
Inflation 0.108 0.065 -0.044*** 0.142 0.070 -0.072*** 
 (0.076) (0.056) (0.004) (0.096) (0.054) (0.000) 
 33 56  32 51  
Inflation volatility 0.106 0.060 -0.046*** 0.133 0.065 -0.068*** 
 (0.078) (0.069) (0.003) (0.088) (0.057) (0.000) 
 33 56  32 51  
Gini coefficient 45.333 36.789 -8.543*** 48.208 37.265 -10.943*** 
 (7.312) (7.410) (0.000) (7.523) (5.974) (0.000) 
 22 37  32 51  
Descriptive statistics based on whole sample averages. For each of the five variables represented in the first column, the 
mean is calculated under both presidential (‘Pres’) and parliamentary (‘Parl’) regimes, with both the standard deviation (in 
parentheses) and number of observations presented underneath. In the fourth and seventh columns the difference between 
these two means are presented, with p-values from t-tests presented underneath (in parentheses). A standard star 
convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Both BG and PT are used 
in classifying presidential versus parliamentary regimes; in the case of the former, semi-presidential systems are not 
included in the analysis. 
  
  
Table 3 Instruments for the form of government 
  PT  Rockey promulgated Rockey elections 
 BGs BGd PT BGs BGd PT BGs BGd PT 
con81 0.313*** 0.178** 0.136** 0.053 0.040 0.064 -0.123 -0.309*** -0.335*** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.043) (0.498) (0.625) (0.407) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) 
con5081 -0.055 -0.138** -0.258*** 0.032 0.009 -0.115 -0.072 -0.205*** -0.237*** 
 (0.420) (0.048) (0.000) (0.702) (0.918) (0.164) (0.354) (0.009) (0.002) 
con2150 -0.020 -0.155** -0.127** 0.400*** 0.331*** 0.325*** 0.200 -0.025 -0.061 
 (0.763) (0.025) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.767) (0.479) 
EurFrac 0.549*** 0.503*** 0.472*** 0.568*** 0.524*** 0.480*** 0.531*** 0.490*** 0.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EngFrac -0.770*** -0.806*** -0.799*** -0.767*** -0.766*** -0.739*** -0.774*** -0.813*** -0.835*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latitude -0.953*** -1.363*** -1.616*** -0.792*** -1.179*** -1.342*** -0.792*** -1.324*** -1.383*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DemAge 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FrankRom 0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.034 0.028 0.007 0.000 -0.004 -0.036 
 (0.607) (0.987) (0.608) (0.210) (0.328) (0.792) (0.993) (0.888) (0.200) 
R2 0.580 0.598 0.660 0.603 0.612 0.667 0.562 0.598 0.618 
F-test all 36.289 39.038 48.537 38.888 40.422 50.183 32.840 38.119 40.407 
F-test gov 13.931 11.658 14.543 11.694 9.790 23.261 9.690 6.266 13.142 
Results from first stage regressions of the proposed instruments for the form of government. The first column represents the 
set of constitutional timing variables used as instruments (in conjunction with latitude and language instruments): PT being 
those constitutional dummies used in PT; and ‘Rockey promulgated’ and ‘Rockey elections’ representing similar timing 
dummy variables from Rockey (2012) when a constitution was promulgated and when free elections were held, respectively. 
The instrument set are defined as follows: con81, con5081 and con2150 refer to dummies representing that the constitution 
in the relevant country was adopted after 1981; between 1950 and 1981 and between 1921 and 1950, respectively. EurFrac 
and EngFrac are the fractions of the population speaking one of the European languages and English, respectively.  Latitude 
denotes the latitude of the capital city, and DemAge is the length of time over which the country in question has been 
operating in a democracy. FrankRom is the trade share of the economy from Frankel and Romer (1996). Each set of 
instruments are tested to determine how well they fit our three measures of forms of government: the scale variable using 
the classification from BG where semi-presidential regimes score 0.5, presidential regimes 1, and zero otherwise; the dummy 
variable classification using BG (BGd); and PT classification. The bottom three rows display F-test statistics on the first stage 
regression for all instruments (‘F-test all’); for just the constitutional timing variable (‘F-test gov’); as well as the R2 statistic 
from the first stage regression. 
 
 
  
 Table 4 Economic growth and the form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Pres -0.814*** -0.868*** -0.916*** -1.173*** -1.153*** -1.198*** -0.593** -0.622** -0.691** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) 
Semi-pres  0.236   -0.017   0.151  
  (0.581)   (0.959)   (0.623)  
Maj    -0.562* -0.502* -0.380 -0.094 -0.066 -0.134 
    (0.070) (0.090) (0.215) (0.734) (0.814) (0.657) 
InitialGDP    -0.818*** -0.794*** -0.800*** -1.371*** -1.375*** -1.375*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education    3.850*** 3.863*** 2.518*** 0.420 0.622 0.827 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.666) (0.536) (0.446) 
Fertility       -0.697*** -0.644*** -0.509** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
LifeExp       0.055* 0.062* 0.046 
       (0.090) (0.055) (0.338) 
Openness       0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 
       (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) 
GovtSize       -2.653 -2.927 -4.094*** 
       (0.170) (0.144) (0.025) 
ExRateVol       0.000 0.000 0.001 
       (0.568) (0.435) (0.175) 
R2 
0.176 0.178 0.210 0.294 0.292 0.339 0.390 0.389 0.429 
N 263 263 210 205 205 169 204 204 169 
Dependent variable is the mean annual GDP per capita growth rates over the panel time horizon. Coefficients are estimates 
from random effects regression using panels between 1965-1979, 1980-1994 and 1995-2009 including time dummies and 
a constant (not presented). Results from columns (1), (4) and (7) present those using the scale variable of the f orm of 
government using BG, in columns (2), (5) and (8) dummy variables for both types of government from the BG, and similar in 
(3), (6) and (9) for presidential data from PT. The star convention is standard and is as stated in Table 2. P-values of t-
statistics are in parentheses where heteroskedastic clustered robust standard errors have been used. 
 
 
  
 Table 5 Economic growth: instrumental variable and Heckman correction specifications  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Instrumental variables     
Pres -1.168*** -1.197*** -1.217*** -2.333*** -2.139*** -2.076*** -1.432*** -1.365*** -1.505*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Semi-pres  0.305  -0.151   0.124  
  (0.330)  (0.708)   (0.676)  
Sargan-Hansen 0.140 0.240 0.171  0.385 0.527 0.529 0.296 0.625 0.435 
    Heckman correction     
Pres -1.010*** -1.041*** -1.343*** -1.217*** -1.243*** -1.234*** -0.640*** -0.701*** -0.806*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.010) (0.003) 
Semi-pres  0.236  0.093   0.070  
  (0.476)  (0.771)   (0.816)  
Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those 
presented in Table 4 now performing those procedures discussed in Section 3.1. ‘Sargan-Hansen’ refers to results from an 
over-identification test where the null hypothesis is that all instruments are jointly valid. 
 
 
  
 Table 6 Volatility of economic growth and the form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Pres 0.294 0.252 0.165 -0.079 -0.052 -0.246 -0.079 -0.059 -0.359 
 (0.409) (0.475) (0.584) (0.837) (0.893) (0.498) (0.823) (0.868) (0.318) 
Semi-pres  0.724*   0.415   0.475  
  (0.076)   (0.354)   (0.239)  
Maj    -0.307 -0.245 -0.568** -0.302 -0.236 -0.614** 
    (0.433) (0.520) (0.015) (0.413) (0.519) (0.010) 
InitialGDP    -0.137 -0.103 -0.196 -0.037 -0.001 -0.172 
    (0.356) (0.467) (0.211) (0.830) (0.996) (0.329) 
Openness    0.013** 0.013* 0.008** 0.001 0.000 0.002 
    (0.047) (0.057) (0.033) (0.875) (0.964) (0.715) 
Polity    -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.105*** -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.105*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OpenVol       0.086*** 0.088*** 0.046* 
       (0.003) (0.002) (0.089) 
GovtSize       2.369 2.139 -0.411 
       (0.312) (0.345) (0.847) 
ExRateVol       0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (0.679) (0.644) (0.752) 
R2 
0.096 0.096 0.055 0.161 0.159 0.145 0.168 0.170 0.173 
n 281 281 251 246 246 194 246 246 194 
Dependent variable is the standard deviation in annual growth rates of GDP per capita over the panel time horizon; all else 
is as defined earlier. 
 
  
 Table 7 Inflation and the form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Pres 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.029* 0.029 0.034* 0.051** 0.052** 0.050** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.102) (0.096) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) 
Semi-pres  0.032**   0.003   0.020  
  (0.040)   (0.858)   (0.285)  
Maj    -0.031** -0.033** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.078*** 
    (0.039) (0.031) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
InitialGDP    -0.014** -0.015** -0.022** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.027*** 
    (0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) 
Openness    -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) 
ExRateVol    0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.030) (0.052) (0.909) (0.611) (0.580) (0.413) 
CBI       -0.095* -0.094* -0.120** 
       (0.085) (0.092) (0.033) 
R2 
0.178 0.177 0.211 0.189 0.188 0.217 0.238 0.238 0.258 
N 262 262 210 234 234 148 174 174 145 
Dependent variable is the average for the period of π/(1 + π) where π is the annual GDP deflator; all else is as defined earlier. 
 
  
 Table 8 Inflation: instrumental variable and Heckman correction specifications 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Instrumental variables     
Pres 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.090*** 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.075** 0.071** 0.063** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.158) (0.164) (0.026) (0.037) (0.031) 
Semi-pres  0.062* 0.011   0.024  
  (0.055) (0.701)   (0.392)  
Sargan-Hansen 0.508 0.501 0.254 0.107 0.101 0.121 0.248 0.276 0.106 
   Heckman correction     
Pres 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.030* 0.022* 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.031** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.070) (0.051) (0.064) (0.006) (0.001) (0.034) 
Semi-pres  0.017*** 0.000   0.008  
  (0.007) (0.987)   (0.381)  
Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those 
presented in Table 7 now performing those procedures outlined in Section 3.1. 
 
  
 Table 9 Inflation volatility and the form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Pres 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.023* 0.022* 0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.175) (0.369) (0.066) (0.075) (0.353) 
Semi-pres  0.039***   0.019  0.029*   
  (0.004)   (0.157)  (0.067)   
Maj    -0.023** -0.020** -0.030*** -0.024** -0.021* -0.039*** 
    (0.011) (0.033) (0.007) (0.034) (0.06) (0.002) 
InitialGDP    -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) 
Openness    -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.023 -0.023 -0.027 -0.025 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.100) (0.217) (0.142) (0.178) 
OpenVol    0.240*** 0.246*** 0.106 0.192* 0.207* 0.136 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.227) (0.066) (0.050) (0.175) 
ExRateVol    0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
    (0.193) (0.153) (0.166) (0.339) (0.465) (0.128) 
CBI       -0.050* -0.051* -0.072** 
       (0.093) (0.081) (0.016) 
R2 
0.122 0.128 0.149 0.142 0.145 0.148 0.231 0.222 0.212 
N 262 262 210 234 234 173 174 174 145 
Dependent variable is the standard deviation for the period of π/(1 + π) where π is the annual rate of inflation; all variables 
are as defined earlier. 
 
 
 
  
 Table 10 Inflation volatility: instrumental variable and Heckman correction specifications  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Instrumental variables     
Pres 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.048***  0.043**              0.047*** 0.026 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.028* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.006) (0.133) (0.008) (0.005) (0.100) 
Semi-pres  0.043*  0.039*   0.037*  
  (0.066)  (0.080)   (0.070)  
Sargan-Hansen 0.134 0.138 0.150  0.376 0.407 0.141 0.345 0.364 0.137 
    Heckman correction     
Pres 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.033***   0.028***           0.029*** 0.021** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Semi-pres  0.012**  0.013***   0.021**  
  (0.130)  (0.000)   (0.034)  
Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those 
presented in Table 9 now performing those procedures outlined in Section 3.1. 
 
  
 Table 11 Inequality and the form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Pres 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.238*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.211*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Semi-pres  -0.011   -0.012   -0.007  
  (0.835)   (0.796)   (0.873)  
Maj    0.077** 0.061 0.023 0.067* 0.056 0.014 
    (0.037) (0.103) (0.593) (0.076) (0.126) (0.747) 
GovtSize    0.040 0.048 0.002 0.133 0.175 0.152 
    (0.200) (0.134) (0.960) (0.309) (0.188) (0.272) 
Openness    -0.003 0.001 -0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.939) (0.971) (0.594) (0.995) (0.916) (0.275) 
InitialGDP    -0.022 -0.029 0.034 0.016 0.013 0.083* 
    (0.560) (0.453) (0.408) (0.737) (0.788) (0.060) 
InitialGDP2    -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005*** 
    (0.437) (0.422) (0.008) (0.312) (0.300) (0.001) 
HumanCap       -0.071* -0.074* -0.087* 
       (0.081) (0.072) (0.091) 
Inflation       0.007 0.004 -0.002 
       (0.942) (0.972) (0.978) 
R2 
0.125 0.119 0.182 0.197 0.200 0.143 0.302 0.304 0.182 
N 269 269 246 209 209 167 192 192 164 
Dependent variable is the log of the mean Gini coefficient for income inequality over the period of the panel; all else is as 
defined earlier. 
 
  
 Table 12 Inequality: instrumental variable and Heckman correction specifications 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Instrumental variables     
Pres 0.409*** 0.402*** 0.351***  0.582***          0.564*** 0.420*** 0.478*** 0.461*** 0.391*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Semi-pres  0.015  0.220   0.144  
  (0.886)  (0.112)   (0.158)  
Sargan-Hansen 0.009 0.082 0.049  0.634 0.721 0.307 0.582 0.629 0.242 
    Heckman correction     
Pres 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.157*** 0.144***           0.204*** 0.205*** 0.213*** 0.226*** 0.214*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Semi-pres  -0.017  -0.032   -0.030  
  (0.726)  (0.414)   (0.431)  
Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those 
presented in Table 11 now performing those procedures outlined in Section 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Table A1: Data appendix (variables in order of appearance) 
Dependent variables 
 
GDPgrowth Annual growth rate of GDP per capita; data obtained from the World Bank.  
GDP growth 
volatility  
Standard deviation of ‘GDP growth’ (above) over the panel period. 
Inflation  
 
GDP deflator as an annual percentage taken from the World Bank.  
Inflation volatility  Standard deviation of ‘Inflation’ above over the panel period.  
Gini coefficient  Gini coefficient measure of income inequality; data obtained from World Income Inequality Database.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Pres A measure determining if a country is operating under a presidential regime; data obtained from 
both BG and PT. A more detailed discussion of the definitions applied can be found in Section 2.2. 
Semi-Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a semi-presidential regime; data 
obtained from BG. A more detailed discussion of the definition applied can be found in Section 2.2. 
Maj A binary measure indicating if a country is operating under a majoritarian voting system; data 
obtained from BG. 
InitialGDP Log of GDP per capita (expressed in current United States Dollars) at the start of the panel period; 
data obtained from the World Bank. 
Education Metric of education measured as the average total number of years of educational attainment; data 
obtained from Barro and Lee (2013). 
Fertility Log of the fertility rate expressed as the number of births per woman; data obtained from the World 
Bank. 
LifeExp Log of the life expectancy at birth in years; data obtained from the World Bank. 
Openness The sum of imports and exports expressed as a fraction of GDP; data obtained from the World Bank. 
GovtSize Share of government consumption in total GDP; data obtained from Penn World Tables. 
ExRateVol Standard deviation of the exchange rate expressed as a fraction against the US dollar over the panel 
period; data obtained from Penn World Tables. 
Polity Measure of democracy within a given country on a (-10,10) scale; higher values relating to higher 
degrees of democracy and lower values indicating greater degrees of autocracy. Data obtained from 
the Polity IV Project. 
OpenVol Standard deviation of ‘Openness’ (above) over the panel period. 
CBI Measure of central bank independence obtained from Cukierman et al. (1992), Polillo and Guillén 
(2005) and Crowe and Meade (2008), all of whom use the same methodology. 
HumanCap Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education; data 
obtained from the Penn World Table. 
Instrumental variables
 
con2150, 
con5180, con81 
Dummy variables measuring the date of when the constitution within a country was established, 
using dummy variables for periods between 1921 and 1950, between 1950 and 81, and beyond 1981. 
Variables obtained from PT as well as Rockey (2012) who updates these to consider both when a 
constitution was promulgated and when free elections were held under the constitution for the first 
time. 
EurFrac Fraction of the country which speaks one of the main European languages; data obtained from 
Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
EngFrac Fraction of the country which speaks English; data obtained from PT. 
Latitude Latitude of the country’s capital city; data obtained from PT. 
DemAge Measure of the length of time in which the Polity score (see above) has been positive nonstop; that 
is, how long a country has been consistently democratic. 
FrankRom Predicted trade share of an economy, based on a gravity model of international trade that only uses 
a country’s population and geographical features adapted from Frankel and Romer (1996); data 
obtained from Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
 
  
Institutional variables  
 
Polity See above in dependent variables. 
DemAge See above in instrumental variables. 
PartDem A measure of the level to which democracy is participatory within a country; data obtained from 
Varieties of Democracy database. 
ElecDem A measure of the level to which the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved; data obtained from 
Varieties of Democracy database. 
MediaFree The degree to which media is free from government; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy 
database. 
ParComp A variable which measures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can 
be pursued in the political arena; data obtained from Polity IV Project. 
RuleOfLaw A variable measuring agents perceived confidence in the rule of law of a country, in particular over 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts; data obtained from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Xconst Measure of constraints on chief executive where lower numbers represent fewer constraints; data 
obtained from the Polity IV Project. 
PolCon Measure of the feasibility of change in policy given the structure of a nation’s political institutions 
and the preference of the actors that inhabit them; data obtained from the POLCON database. 
Parties Effective number of electoral parties in an election where an average is taken over the time period of 
the panel; data obtained from BG. 
EthPol A measure of the polarisation of ethnicity in a given country; data obtained from Reynal-Querol and 
Montalvo (2005). 
SocPart A measure of society participation through the degree to which policy makers consult society; data 
obtained from Varieties of Democracy database. 
CivLib A measure to the degree in which civil liberties are respected in a country; data obtained from 
Varieties of Democracy database. 
FreeSpeech A measure to the level in which individuals have freedom of speech within a country; data obtained 
from Varieties of Democracy database. 
FreeExp A variable measuring the level of respect governments give to media and press freedoms; data 
obtained from Varieties of Democracy database. 
  
 Table A2 Regression results from robustness tests 
 Growth GrowVol Inflation InfVol Inequality 
 A. The stock and flow of democracy  
Pres -0.638** -0.046 0.051** 0.024* 0.178*** 
 (0.031) (0.895) (0.019) (0.061) (0.000) 
 B. Geographic indicators  
Pres -0.170 -0.208 0.038* 0.025** 0.091* 
 (0.613) (0.544) (0.095) (0.037) (0.061) 
 C. The degree of Protestantism  
Pres -0.638** -0.046 0.051** 0.024* 0.178*** 
 (0.031) (0.895) (0.019) (0.061) (0.000) 
 D. General methods of moments estimation  
Pres -1.505*** 0.013 0.060* 0.028** 0.328*** 
 (0.000) (0.960) (0.059) (0.031) (0.000) 
Robustness results when including additional variables in the analysis. Results presented from column (8) in Tables 4 - 11 
where only the estimated coefficients of the variable of interest have been presented. Similar results are obtained when usin g 
any of the nine specifications from Table 4 - 11 (not reported). In panel A ‘Polity’ and ‘DemAge’ are included in the 
specification; in panel B the regional dummy variables from PT are included in the specification; the specifications in panel  
C include the proportion of the population practicing a protestant faith; and panel D presents instrumental variable results 
using generalized methods of moments. 
 
 
 
 
1Fig. 1 Presidential and parliamentary regimes: macroeconomic outcomes
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Histograms illustrating the distribution of our macroeconomic indicators of interest as an average over the whole
sample (1950-2015) across parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classification for government struc-
tures.
2Fig. 2 Presidential and parliamentary regimes: macroeconomic outcomes
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Scatter plots illustrating specific country outcomes across our macroeconomic indicators of interest as an av-
erage over the whole sample (1950-2015) for parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classification for
government structures. The solid lines in each plot represent median outcomes for each metric across all countries.
3Fig. A1 Presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes
Map illustrating parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes using BG classification for government
structures.
